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Introduction
Stanley Fish’s recently published Versions of Academic Freedom1 completes a 
trilogy of books specifi cally devoted to the academic enterprise. The earlier 
volumes in the sequence were Professional Correctness2 and Save the World on Your 
Own Time.3 But academia is a topic to which Fish has returned repeatedly 
throughout his career, and to appreciate his position fully a reader must also 
consult parts of his other books, such as chapters 8-12 in Doing What Comes 
Naturally4 and chapters 1, 2, 14 and 15 of There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a 
Good Thing, Too.5 As well there is the chapter titled “What’s sauce for one goose: 
The logic of academic freedom” that he contributed to Academic Freedom and the 
Inclusive University6 and his articles “Holocaust denial and academic freedom”7 
and “Academic Freedom: How Odd Is That?”8 Finally, many of his pieces 
in the Chronicle of Higher Education and his “Opinionator” contributions to the 
digital edition of The New York Times9 deal with academia and academic freedom. 
1. STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2014) [hereinafter FISH, VERSIONS].
2. STANLEY FISH, PROFESSIONAL CORRECTNESS (1995) [hereinafter FISH, PROFESSIONAL].
3. STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME (2008) [hereinafter FISH, SAVE].
4. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989) [hereinafter FISH, DOING].
5. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO
(1994) [hereinafter FISH, NO FREE SPEECH].
6. Stanley Fish, What’s Sauce for One Goose: The Logic of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND THE INCLUSIVE UNIVERSITY (Sharon Kahn & Dennis Pavlich, eds., 2001) [hereinafter
ACADEMIC FREEDOM].
7. Stanley Fish, Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom 35 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 499 (2001)
[hereinafter Fish, Holocaust Denial].
8. Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom: How Odd Is That?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 171 (2009) [hereinafter Fish,
How Odd?].
9. Fish’s contributions to the N.Y. Times are archived at People: Stanley Fish, N.Y. TIMES, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/f/stanley_fish/index.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2015).
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In short, this topic is a major theme for Fish, and should be considered as 
seriously as his work in English literature and literary theory, or his work in 
philosophy, politics, and law.10
Fish’s understanding of the academic enterprise is summarized in his 
“three-part mantra: do your job, don’t try to do someone else’s job, and don’t 
let anyone else do your job.”11 He believes that the academy is an institution 
with a distinctive job to do, and that academic freedom is nothing but the 
freedom that must exist in order to get that job done. On Fish’s account, 
however, the job of the academy is much more limited than most people 
suppose it to be. Many of the objectives that most people suppose academics 
are trying to achieve turn out to be “someone else’s job” on Fish’s analysis, 
and so academics should not be trying to do them. The limited scope of the 
academic job means that academic freedom is similarly limited in scope. Fish 
therefore describes his account of academic freedom as “defl ationary”; he sees 
it as letting the air out of a lot of the infl ated claims and grandiose language 
that characterize the conventional accounts of academic freedom.
Fish’s position identifi es two dangers for the academy. One danger arises when 
academics are called upon to justify their work to outsiders. If the academic job 
is limited, and the grander glamour projects turn out to be someone else’s job, 
what arguments can academics use to persuade non-academics (governments, 
parents, foundations) to fund the academy generously and then leave it alone? 
Another danger identifi ed by Fish’s approach arises when academics do not 
maintain a strong sense of their distinctive job, and do not act forcefully to 
defend their role as the people uniquely qualifi ed to perform the job. What can 
happen then, Fish warns, is that outsiders invade or colonize the territory of 
academia and then proceed to advance very diff erent projects or jobs. (This is 
the danger Fish is warning about in the last part of his mantra.) Therefore the 
ability successfully to justify and to defend the academic job becomes crucial, 
both for funding the enterprise and for keeping the barbarians outside the 
gates. However, the logic of Fish’s analysis leaves only a few tools to perform 
this justifi catory task. At the end of this paper I will argue for one more. I will 
also consider the implications of Fish’s position for legal academics and legal 
education in particular.
Fish’s Account of the Academic Job
According to Fish, “[t]he academy is the place where knowledge is advanced, 
where the truth about matters physical, conceptual, and social is sought. That’s 
the job, and that’s also the aspirational norm: the advancement of knowledge 
and the search for truth. . . . They are the ‘internal goods’ the ‘shared pursuit’ 
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH ON PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND LAW (2014) 
[hereinafter ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH]
11. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 16. See also Stanley Fish, Editorial, Why We Built the Ivory Tower, N.Y. 
TIMES, (May 21, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/21/opinion/why-we-built-the-
ivory-tower.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Ivory Tower].
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of which holds the community together.”12 So, “[i]f you’re not in the pursuit-
of-truth business, you should not be in the university,” he concludes.13 This job 
distinguishes the academy from other institutions that have diff erent primary 
jobs, such as achieving obedience to God’s commands, or making money, or 
wielding political power, or healing the sick, or applying the law, and so on. 
But this broad account of the academic job is soon qualifi ed. It is not the truth 
about any conceivable matter that is to be pursued by academics; rather, it is 
the truth about matters that have been identifi ed as worthy by the disciplinary 
traditions housed within the academy. This limits the scope of the academic 
job. The working life of an academic is shaped and structured by professional 
concerns; it is not a free-fl oating search for truths about anything under the 
sun. “There are many things to be true or false about, and not all of them fall 
within the university’s sphere,” as Fish puts it.14 For him, “the idea of teachers 
and students joined in an eff ort to determine the truth of a disciplinary matter—the 
interpretation of a poem, the causes of an event, the origins of a virus—limits 
both the kinds of questions that can be asked and the answers that can be 
appropriately given.”15
The idea of the academic as a competent member of a community of 
credentialed professionals is absolutely central for Fish.16 To become a member 
of this community, the academic undergoes a process of undergraduate, 
graduate, and even postgraduate training and socialization. As a result, he 
or she internalizes the values, methodologies, projects, and decorums of the 
community. Indeed, according to Fish, the academic’s very consciousness is 
structured and enabled by this training and socialization.17 This structuring 
is evident when academics pursue their respective disciplinary truths by 
engaging in teaching and research. When a fully embedded member of the 
academic community engages in research, he or she naturally does so in a 
manner that comports with academic standards of decorum, some of which 
Fish makes explicit:
Researchers should not falsify their credentials, or make things up, or fudge 
the evidence, or ignore data that tells against their preferred conclusions. 
Those who publish should acknowledge predecessors and contributors, 
12. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 131-32; see also id. at 10.
13. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 20; see also id. at 119.
14. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 34. See also Stanley Fish, A Closing Argument (for Now), N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (Nov. 12, 2006, 10:11 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/
one-more-time-for-a-while/?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Closing Argument] (“But (and here’s the 
rub) the truth you are in search of as a teacher must be an academic truth, not truth generally, 
or the truth about anything and everything.”).
15. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 176 (emphasis added).
16. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 10 (“College and university teachers are professionals, and 
as such the activities they legitimately perform are professional activities, activities in which 
they have a professional competence.”).
17. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 7-15.
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provide citations to their sources, and strive always to give an accurate account 
of the materials they present.18
When a fully embedded member of the academic community engages in 
teaching, he or she introduces students to existing disciplinary projects, 
methods, and materials, and seeks to turn them into fellow competent 
members of the profession.
College and university teachers can (legitimately) do two things: (1) introduce 
students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that had not 
previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip those same students 
with the analytical skills—of argument, statistical modeling, laboratory 
procedure—that will enable them to move confi dently within those traditions 
and to engage in independent research after a course is over.19
An academic who does not abide by these decorums can rightly be disciplined 
by other members of the community. Such lapses are normally instances of a 
failure of socialization, that needs to be corrected. But in extreme cases the 
academic may be expelled from the community. We shall see Fish argue that 
tenure and academic freedom are not designed to protect those who have 
turned their backs on the academic job entirely.
An academic can be induced to act in a manner inconsistent with the projects 
and values of the academy because he or she has imported into the academic 
context projects and values that belong to a completely diff erent enterprise. 
As Fish would describe it, such an academic is trying to do “someone else’s 
job,” not the academic job. Fish’s position is interesting because he classifi es 
as “someone else’s job” many things that others would see as legitimate parts 
of the academic job, and even the most important part. In New Zealand, for 
example, the Education Act (1989) declares that one of the characteristics of a 
university is accepting “a role as critic and conscience of society.”20 This statute 
gives university academics a very special job to do that goes well beyond 
honing disciplinary skills and pursuing disciplinary truths. This special job 
requires them to become actors in the political process as it unfolds outside 
the university. Similarly, Fish described the goals and obligations of academic 
teaching in minimalist terms above, but it is very common for the mission 
statements of American universities to describe much grander goals. Instead 
of just inducting students into particular disciplinary traditions, a university 
education is claimed to eff ect a more radical transformation of the character of 
the student. For example,
Michigan State’s statement promises everything. The university, it announces, 
will produce “an eff ective and productive citizen” who “contributes to 
18. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 19.
19. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 12-13, 18-19; FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 10; Stanley Fish, Aim 
Low, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 16, 2003 [hereinafter Fish, Aim Low].
20. Education Act 1989, s.162(4)(a)(v) (N.Z.).
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society intellectually, through analytical abilities and in the insightful use 
of knowledge; socially, through an understanding and appreciation of the 
world and for [sic] individual group beliefs and traditions; ethically, through 
sensitivity and faithfulness to examined values; and politically through the 
use of reason in aff airs of state.”21
Fish also fi nds this ambitious job of character enhancement endorsed in books 
like Educating Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic 
Responsibility,”22 Education’s End: Why our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on 
the Meaning of Life,23 and in a declaration issued by the presidents of nearly 500 
American universities “on the Civic Responsibility of Higher Education.” It 
called for colleges and universities to take responsibility for helping students 
“realize the values and skills of our democratic society.”24
But for Fish, none of these grand and ambitious jobs is the academic job, and 
university academics should not be attempting to perform them (for reasons I 
will get to in the next section). The non-academic job whose pernicious eff ects 
within the academy most disturb Fish is partisan politics. In both teaching 
and research, Fish insists, it is imperative that an academic professional should 
refuse to engage in advocacy of substantive political or moral positions.25 “The 
only advocacy that should go on in the classroom is the advocacy of . . . 
the intellectual virtues, ‘thoroughness, perseverance, intellectual honesty,’ all 
components of the cardinal academic virtue of being ‘conscientious in the 
pursuit of truth.’”26 Instead of engaging in political advocacy, the duty of the 
academic is to “academicize” any topic under investigation.
The imperative of academicizing says that when you bring a topic into a 
classroom, detach it from its real-world context, where votes are taken or 
policies urged or rallies organized, and insert it into an academic context where 
inquiries into its structure, history, signifi cance and value are conducted by 
21. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 12. See generally id. at 10-17, 54; Stanley Fish, Tip to Professors: Just Do Your 
Job, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 22, 2006, 10:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2006/10/22/tip-to-professors-just-do-your-job/ [hereinafter Fish, Tip to Professors] (“Of 
course, before you can do your job, you have to know what it is. And you will not be helped 
by your college’s mission statement, which will lead you to think that your job is to cure 
every ill the world has ever known—not only illiteracy, bad writing and cultural ignorance, 
which are at least in the ballpark, but poverty, racism, ageism, sexism, war, exploitation, 
colonialism, discrimination, intolerance, pollution and bad character. (The list could be 
much longer.)”).
22. Fish, Aim Low, supra note 19.
23. Stanley Fish, Will the Humanities Save Us?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 6, 2008, 5:31 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/will-the-humanities-save-us/, 
[hereinafter Fish, Will Humanities Save Us?].
24. Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11.
25. In FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, he develops this position at length with respect to 
literary studies in particular.
26. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 20.
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means of the traditional methods (textual, archival, statistical, experimental) 
of humanities, social science, and physical science scholarship.27
For example:
Even in courses where the materials are politically and ideologically charged, 
the questions that arise are academic, not political. A classroom discussion of 
Herbert Marcuse and Leo Strauss, for example, does not (or at least should 
not) have the goal of determining whether the socialist or the conservative 
philosopher is right about how the body politic should be organized. Rather, 
the (academic) goal would be to describe the positions of the two theorists, 
compare them, note their place in the history of political thought, trace the 
infl uences that produced them and chart their own infl uence on subsequent 
thinkers in the tradition. And a discussion of this kind could be led and 
guided by an instructor of any political persuasion whatsoever, and it would 
make no diff erence given that the point of the exercise was not to decide a 
political question but to analyze it.28
Fish acknowledges “the objection that in many courses, especially courses given 
at law school or by political science departments, the materials being studied 
are fraught with political, social, ethical, moral, and religious implications.” 
But he insists that the imperative to academicize does not rule out such 
topics from the classroom.29 It mandates only that any topic be subjected to 
the correct kind of analysis, and that this analysis not include answering the 
question of whether or not a moral or political claim is true. 
I am not urging a restriction on content—any ideology, agenda, even crusade 
is an appropriate object of study. . . . If an idea or a policy is presented as a 
candidate for allegiance . . . then the classroom has been appropriated for 
partisan purposes. But if an idea or policy is subjected to a certain kind of 
interrogation—what is its history? how has it changed over time? who are its 
prominent proponents? what are the arguments for and against it? with what 
other policies is it usually packaged?—then its partisan thrust will have been 
blunted, for it will have become an object of analysis rather than an object of 
aff ection.30
27. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 31. On “academicizing” See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 
27; Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11; Stanley Fish, Always Academicize: My Response to the Responses, 
N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Nov. 5, 2006, 10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2006/11/05/always-academicize-my-response-to-the-responses/ [hereinafter Fish, 
Always Academicize].
28. Stanley Fish, More Colorado Follies, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (May 25, 2008, 7:59 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/more-colorado-follies/.
29. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 15. See also Stanley Fish, Conspiracy Theories 101, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (July 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/opinion/23fi sh.
html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Fish, Conspiracy Theories]; Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 
27.
30. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, 24-25. See also Fish, Tip to Professors, supra note 21.
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Objections to Fish’s Account of the Academic Job
The most basic objection to Fish’s account of the academic job is that he has 
failed to describe accurately what most academics actually do. Naomi Riley’s 
book The Faculty Lounges . . . and Other Reasons Why You Won’t Get the College Education 
You Paid For describes how very few of the academics working in the 4000 
degree-granting colleges and universities in the United States are engaged in 
pursuing new truths and advancing knowledge. In his New York Times piece 
on her book, Fish notes her point that 
“a signifi cant portion of [the] additional degrees that colleges have added in 
the past few decades have been in vocational areas,” and those areas “simply 
do not engage students in a search for ultimate truths,” but instead have pre-
stipulated goals. “Do we need,” she asks, “to guarantee the academic freedom 
of professors engaged in teaching and studying ‘Transportation and Materials 
Moving,’ a fi eld in which more than fi ve thousand degrees were awarded in 
2006?”31
Security and protective services and business statistics are other examples 
Riley provides of the types of courses that fall within her critique. 
The thrust of Riley’s argument is that because many academics in colleges 
and universities are not doing the true academic job, it follows that they 
should not enjoy the tenure and academic freedom that the true academic 
job requires. Fish’s response is that if many academics in colleges and 
universities are not doing the true academic job, and are doing someone 
else’s job instead, then they should either stop doing that non-academic job 
or leave the academy and do it elsewhere. “I say, and have been saying for 
years, that colleges and universities should stop moving in those directions—
toward relevance, bottom-line contributions and social justice—and go back to 
a future in which academic inquiry is its own justifi cation.”32 Purely vocational 
courses like “Transportation and Materials Moving” should be taught in a 
vocational institution, such as a polytechnic or community college, rather than 
a university.
Another objection is that Fish’s imperative to “academicize” is empty because 
it is psychologically impossible. Nobody, not even committed academics, can 
compartmentalize their strong moral and political and religious beliefs, and 
put them to one side while they engage in academic practices.33 Fish’s response 
is that human beings compartmentalize and contextualize in this way all the 
time.34 “We understand . . . that proper behavior at the opera diff ers from 
31. Stanley Fish, Vocationalism, Academic Freedom and Tenure, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(July 11 ,  2011 ,  8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/
vocationalism-academic-freedom-and-tenure/.
32. Id.
33. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 23.
34. See Stanley Fish, Should Our Lives Be Unifi ed?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 18, 2007, 8:27 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/the-myth-of-the-unifi ed-life/.
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proper behavior at a ball game . . .. We refrain . . . from inserting our religious 
beliefs or our private obsessions into every situation or conversation no matter 
what its content.”35 He is not saying that we can detach ourselves from all of 
our deep commitments; he is saying that the deep commitments that grip us at 
any one time are context-specifi c and enterprise-specifi c. This is why he rejects 
the claim that “one’s ethical obligations remain the same no matter where one 
is or what one is doing or what one is being paid to do.”36 Consequently, it can 
be
part of a teacher’s job to set personal conviction aside for the hour or two 
when a class is in session and allow the techniques and protocols of academic 
research full sway. This restraint should not be too diffi  cult to exercise. After 
all, we require and expect it of judges, referees and reporters. And while its 
exercise may not always be total, it is both important and possible to make 
the eff ort.37
He reports that he performs this compartmentalization without diffi  culty in 
his own classroom practice:
I adhere to the distinction between pedagogy and political advocacy, and I do 
so eff ortlessly. I just go in every day and subject the materials to an academic 
interrogation, an interrogation concerned with the structure of arguments 
and the place of those arguments in a tradition of intellectual inquiry. Those 
traditions are complex and richly layered, and attending to them seriously 
takes all one’s energy. It never even occurs to me to turn the discussion into an 
occasion for pronouncing on the political questions of the day, and because 
the parameters of the discussion are so clearly set and so clearly academic, my 
students know better than to introduce such questions. Set it up right and you 
won’t go wrong.38
And other academics achieve this compartmentalization too. Fish describes 
Noam Chomsky’s 2013 John Dewey lectures, given under the auspices of 
Columbia University’s philosophy department, as a “master class” in which 
the jobs of academic interrogation and political advocacy were kept separate, 
even by someone who has well-known strong political views.39 On Fish’s 
analysis it is perfectly acceptable for someone like Chomsky to have strong 
personal political views, as long as he does not bring them into his lectures on 
35. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 23-24.
36. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.
37. Fish, Conspiracy Theories 101, supra note 29.
38. Stanley Fish, Politics and the Classroom: One More Try, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 8, 2008, 
6:57 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/politics-and-the-classroom-
one-more-try/ [hereinafter Fish, Politics and the Classroom].
39. Stanley Fish, Scholarship and Politics: The Case of Noam Chomsky, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/opinion/fish-scholarship-and-politics-the-case-of-noam-
chomsky.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Scholarship and Politics].
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philosophy or linguistics or even politics. Academics should pursue personal 
political goals on their own time, not “on the university’s or state’s dime.”40
I am not counseling moral and political abstinence across the board, only in 
those contexts—like the classroom—where the taking of positions on the war 
in Iraq or assisted suicide or the conduct of foreign policy is extraneous to or 
subversive of the activity being performed.41
A third objection probes the role of truth in Fish’s analysis. Fish says that 
the academic job is to pursue truth, but how can he then say that it would be 
wrong for a political theorist to investigate whether Marcuse’s or Strauss’s 
position on how the body politic should be organized is more true? Fish 
notes the similar objection that “if we compare Mill and Marx, the question 
is not just why did they think what they did but which of them came closer 
to the truth . . . about the way governments should be organized or [the] 
truth about how people should comport themselves, politically and morally.”42 
His response to such challenges is to apply the general point he made earlier: 
“There are many things to be true or false about, and not all of them fall within 
the university’s sphere.”43 He is not denying that political and moral truths are 
important; he is just denying that it is the job of academics to ascertain these 
truths as opposed to other truths.44
Consequently it would be inaccurate to say that Fish wants academics to 
be neutral on political and moral questions while they are doing their jobs. 
“With respect to political judgments, what I’m asking for is not neutrality, 
but hands off . Don’t tip-toe around partisan issues; exclude them outright. 
That’s not neutrality; it’s total avoidance.”45 Nor does Fish see neutrality as 
an academic virtue when it comes to the truths that it is the job of academics 
to ascertain. Here academics should not shrink from taking a strong stand; 
rather, they should make an affi  rmative judgment and defend it to the best of 
their ability. So in response to the question “Are faculty allowed to call it as 
they see it?” Fish replies: “If it is an academic question (what are the pro and 
con arguments for assisted suicide and where in the history of morality and 
philosophy do they come from?), faculty should indeed call it as they see it. 
If the question is a partisan political one (is assisted suicide right or wrong), 
faculty should stay away from it like the plague.”46
40. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 26.
41. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27. 
42. Fish, Politics and the Classroom, supra note 38. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 133.
43. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 34. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 133-34.
44. Fish, Politics and the Classroom, supra note 38; Stanley Fish, Stop Me Before I Write More, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (June 15, 2008, 7:02 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/
stop-me-before-i-write-more/ [hereinafter Fish, Stop Me].
45. Stanley Fish, Buttons: The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 19, 2008, 9:00 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/buttons-the-sequel/.
46. Id. See also Fish, Closing Argument, supra note 14; Fish, Stop Me, supra note 44.
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A deeper challenge to the role of truth in Fish’s analysis can be based on Fish’s 
own commitment to anti-foundationalism. Critics of anti-foundationalism 
say that because it holds that reality is socially constructed, it is compelled to 
hold that there is no objective truth, and that all truths are relative. Given this 
epistemology, how can an anti-foundationalist like Fish say that “truth is the 
pre-eminent academic value, and adherence to it is exactly the opposite of moral 
relativism”?47 In response to challenges such as those from John Searle and 
Thomas Haskell, Fish repeats in Versions of Academic Freedom his long-defended 
position that anti-foundationalism has no relativistic consequences at all.48 
Explaining this position fully here would take me too far afi eld, but in essence 
Fish holds that objective truth is untroubled by whatever epistemologists get 
up to. In contexts outside philosophy seminars, both foundationalists and anti-
foundationalists quite properly ascertain what is objectively true by employing 
the approved techniques developed by historically contingent traditions. Even 
in the context of doing philosophy, Fish would argue that those who think that 
what these human traditions deliver is epistemologically inferior or suspect 
have been seduced by the impossible desire to experience reality as God does, 
rather than as limited and embedded human beings have to.49
A fourth objection to Fish’s account of the academic job takes issue with 
his separation of the academy and politics. The challenge advanced here is 
that “politics is everywhere,” and so it is impossible to avoid it in the academy. 
Everything is said to be political “because in any form of social activity there 
are always alternative courses of action—diff erent ways of doing things—and 
those diff erences will, more often than not, refl ect opposing ideas of what is 
important and valuable.”50 Fish agrees with this “politics is everywhere” claim, 
but he describes it as “both true and trivial.”51 He accepts that disagreement 
is pervasive, and because he does not believe that disagreement can ever be 
authoritatively resolved (as liberals hope) by appealing to neutral principles 
or universal reason,52 he concludes that politics, understood broadly as “the 
realm in which competing agendas, refl ecting opposing views of the way 
things should be, fi ght it out,” is indeed everywhere. “Defi ned that generally, 
the realm of the political is in fact coincident with the entire realm of human 
behavior, and no activity escapes it.”53
Fish is therefore happy to acknowledge many ways in which the academy 
inevitably involves politics in this broad sense, but he insists that this admission 
does not preclude him from separating partisan politics from the academic job. 
47. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 38.
48. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 25-29, 55-56.
49. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 16-47.
50. Fish, Stop Me, supra note 44.
51. Id.
52. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 81-108.
53. Fish, Closing Argument, supra note 14.
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This is because while politics is inescapable in life, politics will always take an 
institution-specifi c form. Politics may be everywhere, but it is not everywhere the 
same. “[T]he Tip O’Neill mantra—all politics is local—should remind us that 
the content of the general category ‘political’ will vary with the local context 
of performance.”54 That is, the particular matters in dispute and the decorums 
governing the conduct of the dispute will vary with social and institutional 
context. Politics in the broad and abstract sense precipitates out into many 
diff erent kinds of limited and particular politics in human life. It follows 
that the issues and decorums that characterize politics in one context cannot 
simply be inserted into a very diff erent context. “[T]he fact that politics marks 
every context of human action doesn’t mean that it is legitimate to import the 
politics appropriate to one context into another which, while no less political, 
will be home to quite diff erent politics.”55
Fish applies this lesson to partisan politics and academic politics. 
Academic politics is concerned with disagreements over matters such as 
which interpretation of a canonical text is correct, the courses that should be 
taught within a department, the allocation of resources between departments, 
the best form of departmental leadership, and so on. These matters do not 
fi gure at all in partisan politics, which is concerned with disagreements over 
which public policy should be advanced through legislation, who should be 
elected, who should be made a judge, who should be able to vote, etc. Nor 
do the acceptable ways of deciding disagreements in partisan politics, such 
as using attack ads, leaking information about an opponent’s private life, and 
forming political action committees, translate over to the academic political 
context. Fish’s point is that academic politics and partisan politics are two 
very diff erent things, and cannot be combined simply because they are both 
instances of “politics” when that term is understood in a highly abstract and 
general way. To the contrary, any eff ort to combine them is confused because 
it fails to appreciate that the academic job and the partisan political job are 
completely diff erent. “My point is not that academics should refrain from 
being political in an absolute sense—that is impossible—but that they should 
engage in politics appropriate to the enterprise they signed onto.”56
Probably the most natural objection to Fish’s account of the academic job is 
that it is too narrow. His professionalization of the academy limits researchers 
to only those matters that the existing disciplinary traditions judge to be 
important, but this constriction of the academic job is said to be improper 
for epistemological and moral reasons. The epistemological objection is 
that narrow professional categories are blinkers that prevent academics from 
gaining a full understanding of their subject matter. If the blinkers were 
thrown away entirely, or if the categories developed by diff erent disciplines 
were all combined, then we could at last achieve comprehensive knowledge 
54. Fish, Stop Me, supra note 44.
55. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 172. See generally 172-74; FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, 29-30; Fish, 
Closing Argument, supra note 14.
56. Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11.
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of what we are interested in. Fish fi nds this objection being advanced by 
those advocating “anti-professionalism,”57 “interdisciplinarity,”58 and “cultural 
studies.”59 By whatever name it is called, Fish declares it to be the expression 
of an impossible desire. His position is that human beings can exist only 
embedded in local contexts, and so the bias and partiality (or blinkers) that 
come with such embeddedness are inescapable. It is not possible for humans 
to step outside all local contexts to achieve a transcendent perspective, nor is it 
possible to combine all local contexts into one master context. Any being that 
could achieve an apprehension of reality that is not a limited, local viewpoint 
would have to be a god, not a human being. Socially developed categories, 
whether professional or not, are therefore a precondition of our experience of 
the world, not an impediment to a true experience of the world.60
So, for example, he identifi es one manifestation of anti-professionalism 
as the desire for “public intellectuals” who can speak directly to the public 
about intellectual matters without having to use the abstruse categories and 
incomprehensible jargon of university academics.61 But Fish argues that the 
“public intellectual” is not an intellectual who has escaped the constraints of 
academic professional categories to communicate a less blinkered viewpoint 
to the public. Instead the public intellectual has just exchanged the categories 
and constraints of one embedded context for another.
In short, the public intellectual is another professional, practicing another 
discipline and enacting a vision no more or less grand than the vision of any 
other professional in any other discipline. The gospel of interdisciplinarity 
depends on the possibility of performing acts that are more than locally 
intelligible and therefore more than locally consequential. There are no 
such acts, although, given certain political conditions, acts proceeding from 
some local perspective can command the fi eld. This, however, will not be the 
triumph of interdisciplinarity, but the triumph of one discipline or angled 
project over all others.”62
The moral objection to Fish’s professionalization of the academy and 
consequent narrowing of its focus to disciplinary concerns alone is that “even 
if it is possible to set aside one’s political convictions when conducting a class, 
it would be unworthy to do so because it would be a dereliction of one’s duty as 
a human being concerned with the well-being of the world.”63 Fish is charged 
with advocating “a hunkering down in the private spaces of an academic 
workplace detached from the world’s problems,” a stance that “forecloses 
57. See, e.g., FISH, DOING, supra note 4, at 163-293 (chapters 8-12).
58. See, e.g., FISH, NO FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 3-50, 231-56 (chapters, 1-2, 14-15).
59. See, e.g., FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 78-79, 104-06.
60. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 7-47.
61. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 115-26.
62. Id. at 139. See also id. at 71-72.
63. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 29.
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the possibility of civic engagement and democratic action.”64 Rather than 
pursuing mere disciplinary truths and distancing themselves from moral and 
political substance by academicizing everything, academics should be using 
their skills to advance larger goals such as social justice, or individual freedom. 
They should be working to inculcate desirable values in their students such as 
tolerance, or an appreciation of our Western cultural heritage.
We have already encountered one of Fish’s responses to this moral 
objection: Academics have to refrain from seeking political outcomes only 
while they are engaged in their academic jobs. On their own time they can 
work for increased democratic participation or a reduced role for the state 
as hard as they want. If an academic feels that this part-time response is 
inadequate, given the magnitude of the problems facing the world, then Fish 
advises that he or she “get out of teaching and into a line of work more likely 
to address directly the real world problems you want to solve.”65 That is, if 
you fi nd the academic job unsatisfying, go and do another one, but do not 
remain an academic if you are not prepared to do the academic job. Another 
response to the moral objection is that academics are not ignoring the world of 
values when they stick to the academic job during working hours. Instead they 
are advancing specifi cally academic values. “[T]he search for truth is its own 
value, and fi delity to it mandates the accompanying values of responsibility in 
pedagogy and scholarship.”66 So he is “not saying that universities should be 
unprincipled, but that the principles they adhere to and enforce should be the 
principles appropriate to their mission and not principles that belong to other 
enterprises.”67 Values and principles, like politics, are enterprise-specifi c for 
Fish, and it is a mistake to think that they can be detached from one enterprise 
and simply inserted into another.
But these two responses to the moral objection just nibble at its fringes. A 
more adequate response must face it more directly, and Fish endeavors to do 
this with six more arguments in which he claims that it would be wrong to 
do as the moral objector asks and include in the academic job any more than 
he has. The fi rst three of these arguments are relatively narrow in scope. One 
is legalistic: An academic’s contract of employment covers only disciplinary 
64. Stanley Fish, Neoliberalism and Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Mar. 8, 2009, 10:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/neoliberalism-and-higher-education/.
65. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.
66. Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11. 
67. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 33. See also Stanley Fish, Take the Money and Run, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (Oct. 8, 2006), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/stanley-fi sh/
page/27/. Said Fish:
Neither does the university have a moral policy, except with respect to the responsibilities 
of teaching and research. No cheating, no plagiarizing, no falsifying of data or fudging 
of evidence; you can’t harass students or show up for class unprepared, or fail to return 
papers or meet classes. Those (along with a great many other things) are the principles 
of academic morality, and the university has not only the right, but the obligation to 
monitor and enforce them. It has no right or obligation or competence to monitor and 
enforce the morality of the world.
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tasks. The academic job is “defi ned . . . by contract and by the course catalogue 
rather than by a vision of democracy or world peace.”68 Therefore if academics 
take up these other jobs, they “abandon the responsibilities that belong to 
them by contract in order to take up responsibilities that belong properly to 
others.”69 The second narrow argument is tactical: Making partisan politics 
part of the academic job could expose the university to danger from hostile 
political actors. “[M]any who wished for increased public attention to their 
labours got it in the past few years of the right-wing backlash and found 
that, rather than bringing respect and infl uence, it brought danger and the 
elimination of progressive programmes.”70 If academics want to protect their 
pursuit of disciplinary truths from interference by legislators and trustees and 
political activists, then they should stay well away from the partisan politics 
job. 
My contention is that if every college or university instructor were to hew to 
this discipline . . . those who want to do our jobs for us would have no traction 
or point of polemical entry because politics, or religion, or ethics would enter 
the classroom only as objects of analysis and not as candidates for approval or 
rejection. The culture wars, at least in the classroom, would be over.71
Fish’s third narrow argument is empirical: There is no evidence that academics 
can do the job of improving the character of students.72 Fish doesn’t deny that 
a particular student’s character and subsequent conduct might be aff ected (for 
good or ill) by taking a particular course. “But these are contingent eff ects, 
and as contingent eff ects they cannot be designed and shouldn’t be aimed 
at. (It’s not a good use of your time to aim at results you have only a random 
chance of producing.)”73 “There are just too many intervening variables, too 
many uncontrolled factors that mediate the relationship between what goes on 
in a classroom or even in a succession of classrooms and the shape of what is 
fi nally a life.”74 Therefore his “main objection to moral and civic education in 
our colleges and universities is not that it is a bad idea (which it surely is), but 
that it’s an unworkable idea.”75
Fish’s fi nal trio of arguments against those who would add other jobs to 
his conception of the academic job all claim that these new jobs would lead to 
the diminishment and ultimately the destruction of the academic enterprise. 
Argument four is that “it is a requirement for the respectability of an enterprise 
68. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 10. 
69. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 14
70. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 96.
71. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 169-70.
72. Fish, Will Humanities Save Us?, supra note 23.
73. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 13.
74. Fish, Aim Low, supra note 19.
75. Id.
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that it be, or at least be able to present itself as, distinctive.”76 That is, an 
enterprise has to have a clear sense of what its special job is. But Fish believes 
that if the moral objector’s many new jobs are added to the core academic job 
of advancing disciplinary truths, it will no longer be clear that the academy is 
distinctive. The core academic job will be subsumed and lost among the many 
other jobs. The academy will be transformed into just another location where 
people seek to advance jobs that originate outside the academy. “‘Narrow’ is 
an adjective the academy should not shun but embrace, for if academic activity 
cannot be narrowly defi ned, it loses its shape and becomes indistinguishable 
from political rallies and partisan exhortation.”77 Argument fi ve is that some 
of the moral objector’s new jobs cannot simply be added to Fish’s narrow job 
because they confl ict with it. Take achieving respect for diversity, for example. 
Encouraging students to respect a diversity of interests, beliefs, and identities 
leaves no space for the narrow academic job of engaging in “the evaluation, 
not the celebration, of interests, beliefs and identities; after all, interests can be 
base, beliefs can be wrong, and identities are often irrelevant to an inquiry.”78 
Similarly, achieving “intellectual diversity” among university teachers advances 
a political goal—more politically conservative professors on the university 
staff —at the expense of an academic goal.79 On Fish’s account of the academic 
job the political allegiances of the professors are irrelevant because those 
allegiances are never activated. It makes no diff erence whether the professors 
are all Republicans or all Democrats if all they do is “academicize.” But if 
professors are openly hired on the basis of their party affi  liations, it legitimates 
the injection of partisan party positions into their job performance, and this is 
antithetical to academicizing.
Fish’s sixth and last argument is the deepest, and draws upon his 
philosophical anti-foundationalism. A foundationalist holds that Reality has 
its own characteristics and exists completely independently of the human 
observer. The job of the human observer is to apprehend these characteristics 
accurately, and then base any knowledge claims upon the foundation of this 
independent Reality. An anti-foundationalist holds that we never apprehend 
76. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 17.
77. Stanley Fish, Boycotting Israeli Universities, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Nov. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/opinion/fi sh-boycotting-israeli-universities-part-two.
html. See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 169 (“[A]gendas imported into the classroom 
from foreign venues do not enrich the pedagogical task, but overwhelm it and erode its 
constitutive distinctiveness.”); FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 117 (“When Butler calls for 
a ‘more robust conception of academic freedom,’ one that does not rule out the debating 
of political matters with a view to deciding them, she is calling for the end of the academy 
as a place where a distinctive activity is performed and advocating instead for a place 
indistinguishable at bottom from the ballot-box, the parliamentary debate, and the street 
rally.”).
78. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 11.
79. See Fish’s discussion of David Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights in SAVE at 118-23; FISH, 
VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 71-73. See also Stanley Fish, Intellectual Diversity, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION, Feb. 13, 2004.
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Reality directly; rather, we always apprehend it in a mediated fashion. What 
mediates our apprehension is a background of socially inculcated beliefs, 
values, categories, etc. This background both enables and structures our experience 
of the world. So if the background changes signifi cantly, the world we 
experience changes too.80 This has implications for the academic job and the 
objects of academic study. If we take away the existing disciplinary categories, 
the object of our disciplinary concern is not thereby revealed in its full glory, 
as the earlier epistemological objection supposed. Instead it disappears. We 
apprehend in its place a diff erent object made available by the new categories 
and beliefs and values that have replaced the old disciplinary background (i.e., 
the ones that the moral objector favors). “When you exchange one activity for 
another, you lose something, and although you might mask the loss by calling 
the new activity by the old name, the phenomena that come into view under 
the previous dispensation will have disappeared in your brave new world.”81 
Because Fish the anti-foundationalist sees a move away from the narrow 
conception of the academic job as involving the loss of the very things that 
the established disciplines studied, and because Fish the academic sees value 
in those studies, he strongly opposes any move that would change the narrow 
academic job.
I am aware that the argument I am making here is a hybrid, perhaps even a 
monster. I combine an antifoundationalist epistemology with an insistence 
on maintaining a foundational structure that is, by my own admission, 
artifi cial, historically emergent and, therefore, challengeable; and I do so in 
the conviction that without such a foundation—supported by nothing but 
itself—a certain mode of experience will be lost.82
Fish’s Account of Academic Freedom
As we have seen, for Fish the academic job is the pursuit of truth and the 
advancement of knowledge regarding matters identifi ed as signifi cant by 
existing disciplinary traditions. He then argues that academic freedom gets its 
content and its justifi cation from the nature of the academic job; it is nothing 
but the freedom necessary to do the academic job. That job requires academics 
to follow their evidence and arguments wherever they lead, no matter who 
might be dismayed or disadvantaged by their conclusions. Therefore, if you 
want the academic job done, you must guarantee to academics the freedom to 
follow evidence and arguments to their disciplinary conclusions without being 
subject to pressure from non-academics such as university administrators and 
80. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 7-47.
81. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 69-70. See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 23, 25; FISH, 
VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 128.
82. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 127. Id. at 63 (“The question fi nally is whether academic 
disciplines are mere placeholders for virtues and values that do not depend upon them for 
their defi nition and fl ourishing, or whether academic disciplines are constitutive of those 
virtues and values and so must be maintained in their integrity lest what they make possible 
is lost.”).
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trustees, politicians, businessmen, parents of students, or “public opinion.” 
This is the minimalist, defl ationary account of academic freedom that he 
describes and defends in Versions of Academic Freedom as the “It’s just a job” 
school.83 Academic freedom can be guaranteed by an employment contract, 
or by a statute, as in New Zealand,84 but on Fish’s argument these legal 
devices merely memorialize and reinforce a right that must already exist if the 
academic job exists.
You start with the idea of pursuing a line of inquiry to whatever conclusion 
it brings you, and then you ask for the freedom to engage in that pursuit 
without interference from external forces that would tie you to the agendas of 
another enterprise. The freedom you ask for is not added on to the project; it 
is constitutive of it, for you can’t follow where an inquiry takes you if obstacles 
are constantly put in your way. When all is said and done, academic freedom 
is just a fancy name for being allowed to do your job, and it is only because 
that job has the peculiar feature of not having a pre-stipulated goal that those 
who do it must be granted a degree of latitude and fl exibility not granted to 
the practitioners of other professions, who must be responsive to the customer 
or to the bottom line or to the electorate or to the global economy.85
Academic freedom is quite distinct from freedom of speech, according to 
Fish. The right of freedom of speech applies to everyone, whereas academic 
freedom applies only to those few people engaged in academic work. The right 
of freedom of speech protects speech without regard to its content (with some 
limited exceptions), but academic freedom is not indiff erent to content. A lot 
of content can be excluded from the academic context on academic grounds, 
and this will not violate academic freedom.
Here we see a diff erence between the First Amendment and academic 
freedom. The First Amendment stands for the proposition that all points of 
view must be given a hearing and none excluded; and while academic freedom 
also insists that ideas should be given a hearing, it erects a barrier that must 
be negotiated before a particular idea is welcomed into the conversation as 
a legitimate participant; it must pass muster before a body of credentialed 
experts; and if it does not, it will be sent away without apology and without 
any philosophical or moral anxieties. The academy is not a democracy; it is a 
structure of authority, and it is in the business of excluding what it has judged 
to be unworthy.86
83. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 9-10. See also id., at 20-36 (chapter 2).
84. The Education Act 1989, s. 161 (N.Z.).
85. Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom is Not a Divine Right, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 
5, 2008. See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 80-81; FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 20, 24, 
87; Stanley Fish, An Authoritative Word on Academic Freedom, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Nov. 23, 
2008, 10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/an-authoritative-word-
on-academic-freedom/ [hereinafter Fish, Authoritative Word].
86. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 148. See also FISH, NO FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 107; Stanley 
Fish, What’s Sauce for One Goose: The Logic of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 
6, at 6, 11; Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom in Brooklyn: Part Two, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 
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While freedom of speech is an important political value in a liberal society, 
Fish acknowledges, it is not an important academic value.87 A primary goal 
of freedom of speech is to facilitate political speech, “[b]ut in the academy, 
political urgings are off -limits. . . . This is particularly the case in the 
classroom, where any eff ort at political (as opposed to intellectual) persuasion 
is called indoctrination and is rightly rejected.”88 Freedom of speech has a 
constitutional foundation in America, but academic freedom does not—it is 
just the prerequisite for doing one particular job.89 Indeed Fish concludes 
that, apart from employment contracts, “it is not at all clear that academic 
freedom has any substantial presence in the law.”90
Academic freedom, on Fish’s analysis, is a group right rather than an 
individual right. It is the right of a group engaged in a particular job to do 
that job without interference by outsiders, and to be the only ones who have 
the jurisdiction to regulate the doing of that job.
The professional concept of academic freedom is the product of the guild’s 
desire (shared with other guilds) to order its own aff airs with a minimum 
of interference from the outside; academic freedom is the freedom, fi rst, to 
pursue professional goals, and, second, to specify for itself the appropriate 
means of realizing those goals. The profession is jealous of its prerogatives 
and reluctant to yield them to other authorities, including the authority of 
the courts.91
It follows that academic freedom does not give to individual academics the right 
to act against the norms of the professional group. Instead it gives to individual 
academics the right to be subject only to the norms of the professional group, 
and not to the norms and demands of any non-academic constituencies. Fish 
adopts Robert Post’s formulation that academic freedom, as it applies to an 
individual, “is best understood ‘as the unimpeded application of professional 
norms of inquiry.’”92
If academic freedom is assigned to the college or university, the scope of the 
individual faculty member’s freedom is limited fi rst by the norms embodied 
in the particular institution’s regulations, and ultimately by the norms that are 
said, by tradition and disciplinary authority, to defi ne the academic enterprise 
in general.93
25, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedom-
in-brooklyn-part-two/ [hereinafter Fish, Academic Freedom in Brooklyn Two].
87. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 20.
88. Fish, How Odd?, supra note 8, at 179.
89. Fish, Authoritative Word, supra note 85.
90. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at x.
91. Id. at x, 21; FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 80; Fish, Academic Freedom in Brooklyn Two, supra note 86.
92. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 52. See also Fish, How Odd?, supra note 8, at 178.
93. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 74.
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Academic freedom therefore will not cover behavior that violates professional 
norms or is subversive of the university’s core rationale. Fish argues that 
academics themselves have to be vigilant to maintain academic standards and 
to discipline and, if necessary, expel those members of the professional group 
who violate them.94 It is this vigilance that he notes and approves of in the 
expulsion and exclusion of Holocaust deniers from history departments, even 
if they have professional qualifi cations. (He criticizes the attempt to justify this 
expulsion only on epistemological grounds instead of nakedly professional 
ones.)95 But a lack of clarity in thinking about the academic job and academic 
freedom has, he believes, resulted in not enough of the necessary vigilance 
being exercised. Too often academic freedom is thought of as the right of an 
individual academic to do whatever he or she wants, without any constraints. 
Thus an academic who refuses to teach the advertised content for a course, 
and instead fi lls it with calls to engage in radical political action against the 
existing social order (“academic squatting”) has been able to defend it as an 
exercise of his academic freedom.96 Fish holds that such confused thinking 
about academic freedom will come at a cost. In The Chronicle of Higher Education 
he identifi ed two costs, one external and the other internal:
The external consequence was warned against in the American Association 
of University Professors’ 1915 General Report Of The Committee On 
Academic Freedom And Academic Tenure: “If this profession should prove 
itself unwilling to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, or to 
prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of science from being used 
as a shelter for ineffi  ciency, for superfi ciality, or for critical and intemperate 
partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by others.” . . . But 
the internal danger is more to be feared and is more often realized. It is the 
danger of dysfunction and its attendant evils—unhappiness, bitterness, loss 
of morale, stagnation. When someone is not pulling his or her weight, the 
burden falls to others who, as responsible persons, will take up the slack 
but with a (justifi able) sense of unfairness. If this goes on for a long time 
as it often does, the entire operation of a department will be deformed as 
everyone gets into the bad habit of working around the colleague no one is 
willing to discipline. And the longer a “rogue” faculty member “gets away 
with it,” the more diffi  cult it will be to turn around a situation to which all 
have contributed.97
The limited nature of academic freedom on Fish’s analysis has other 
consequences that are worth noting briefl y. Academic freedom gives academics 
no right to participate in the governance of the university, nor to criticize the 
94. Fish, Authoritative Word, supra note 85. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 126 (“If members 
of the academy wish to continue doing what they have been trained to do—turn the lens of 
disinterested inquiry on the objects of its attention—it is up to them to monitor the conditions 
that ensure the health of their practice.”).
95. Fish, Holocaust Denial, supra note 7, at, 505, 512, 520-21.
96. See Fish’s discussion of Denis Rancourt in FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 104-09.
97. Stanley Fish, Discipline and Punish, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 15, 2002.
691Book Review: Versions of Academic Freedom
university administration (“intramural criticism”), because these things are 
not necessary to do the academic job.98 Students have no academic freedom, 
because they are not professionals engaged in the academic job. “The only 
freedom students rightly have is the freedom to vote with their feet if they 
don’t like the syllabus in a particular course,” and the only right they have is 
“the right to competent and responsible instruction.”99 Extracurricular events 
do not involve academic freedom issues, because such events are, by defi nition, 
outside the teaching and researching that constitutes the academic job. So 
there are no academic freedom issues raised when a controversial person is 
invited onto the campus to give a graduation address or public lecture or to 
receive an honorary degree. Nor are academic freedom issues raised if this 
person is subsequently un-invited. The only issue Fish sees here relates to the 
wisdom of the people doing the inviting and uninviting, because the image 
and reputation of the university can be harmed by their actions.100 Similarly 
he does not see academic freedom issues being raised by what is published or 
denied publication in student newspapers.101
The rest of this book is devoted to describing and dispatching four competing 
schools of academic freedom. The fi rst of these is the “For the common good” 
school, “in which professional values are subordinated to the higher values 
of democracy or justice or freedom; that is, to the common good.”102 In other 
words, academic freedom does not aim simply to advance the academic 
enterprise; it has the broader goal of benefi ting society. The section in the 
New Zealand Education Act (1989) that said that a university must accept “a 
role as critic and conscience of society”103 is an expression of this conception of 
academic freedom. The next is the “Academic exceptionalism or uncommon 
beings” school.104 This position augments the “For the common good” school 
by claiming that academics have special qualities that enable them to act for 
the common good, and this entitles them to special rights that are guaranteed 
under the heading of academic freedom. The “Academic freedom as critique” 
school does see academic freedom operating within the academy, but in a 
negative way. Rather than being used to advance the academic enterprise, 
98. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 92-96; Fish, How Odd?, supra note 8, at 181-82.
99. Stanley Fish, Politics by Any Other Name, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (May 2, 2006, 9:33 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/05/02/politics-by-any-other-name/?_r=0.
100. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 72-78; Stanley Fish, There’s No Business Like Show Business, N.Y. TIMES: 
OPINIONATOR (Oct. 15, 2006, 10:27 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/
theres-no-business-like-show-business/; Stanley Fish, The Kushner Flap: Much Ado About Nothing, 
N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (May 8, 2011, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/05/08/the-kushner-fl ap-much-ado-about-nothing/.
101. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 89-90.
102. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 11, 37-49 (chapter 3).
103. Education Act 1989, s.162(4)(a)(v) (N.Z.).
104. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 11-12, 74-103 (chapter 5). 
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academic freedom should be used to deconstruct the presuppositions of the 
academic enterprise.
One should not rest complacently in the norms and standards presupposed 
by the current academy’s practices; one should instead interrogate those 
norms and make them the objects of critical scrutiny rather than the baseline 
parameters within which critical scrutiny is performed. Academic freedom is 
understood by this school as a protection for dissent and the scope of dissent 
must extend to the very distinctions and boundaries the academy presently 
enforces.105
Finally the “Academic freedom as revolution” school takes the activity of deep 
negative critique developed by the previous school and directs it at society as 
a whole, rather than just at particular academic disciplines. For the members 
of this school, society does not merely need to have an external critic and 
conscience prodding it to do better now and again. Instead the job of the 
academic is to expose the defective ideological assumptions that underpin 
our unjust society and that foster oppression and exploitation. But simply 
describing this state of aff airs is not enough; the academic must act forcefully 
to change it, and must seek to encourage the students to do likewise. Academic 
freedom, according to this school, protects the ability of the academic to 
engage in this radical and critical political work.106
As I have shown in the previous section, Fish has developed six general 
arguments against the position that the academic job should be expanded 
beyond the core disciplinary task he described. All of these arguments could 
be used to challenge the rival schools on academic freedom, because all four 
of these schools originate in more expansive conceptions of the academic 
job.107 In Versions of Academic Freedom he also adopts the strategy of identifying 
and critiquing particular people who have sought to advance one of these rival 
schools of academic freedom either in their writing or by their actions. (For 
example, Robert Post, Judith Butler, and Denis Rancourt.) His conclusion is 
that all of his opponents fail to give adequate weight to the word “academic” 
in the term “academic freedom.” Instead of seeing academic freedom as the 
freedom to carry out a distinctively academic practice without interference from 
outsiders, they all see it as a freedom to do something more than participate in 
a disciplinary tradition.
“To me, academic freedom has always meant the right to insist that academic 
freedom be more than academic.” [Howard Zinn.] This declaration has the 
virtue of illustrating just how the transformation of academic freedom from 
a doctrine insulating the academy from politics into a doctrine that demands 
105. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 12-13, 50-73 (chapter 4).
106. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 13-15, 104-28 (chapter 6).
107. See, e.g., id. at 127 (“A capacious defi nition of academic freedom, urged in the name of social 
justice and human solidarity, undermines both academic freedom and the very idea of 
academic life.”).
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of academics blatantly political actions is managed. What you do is diminish 
(fi nally to nothing) the limiting force of the adjective “academic” and at 
the same time put all the emphasis on freedom (which should be re-written 
FREEDOM) until the academy loses its distinctive status and becomes just 
one more location of a universal moral/political struggle.108
Justifying the Academic Job
Fish’s defl ationary description of the academic job and academic freedom 
achieves clarity, but this comes at a cost. Academic freedom is declared to be 
necessary to get the academic job done, but why does the narrow academic job 
Fish describes need to be done at all? If the academic job involved elevating 
the character of students, or improving democratic functioning, or achieving 
social justice, or providing employment or useful goods and services, then 
it would not be diffi  cult to justify to non-academics. But if the correct 
description of the academic job makes reference to none of these things, why 
should anyone other than those already embedded in a disciplinary practice 
care about it? It is to Fish’s credit that he goes down the defl ationary road 
right to the end and grasps this nettle fi rmly and without evasion:
Who is going to pay for the purifi ed academic enterprise that I celebrate in 
these pages? . . . . How do you sell to legislators, governors, trustees, donors, 
newspapers, etc., an academy that marches to its own drummer, an academy 
that asks of the subjects that petition for entry only that they be interesting, an 
academy unconcerned with the public yield of its activities, an academy that 
puts at the center of its operations the asking of questions for their own sake? 
How, that is, do you justify the enterprise? . . . . The only honest thing to do 
when someone from the outside asks “what use is this venture anyway?” is to 
answer “none whatsoever,” if by “use” is meant (as it always will be) of use to 
those with no investment in the obsessions internal to the profession.109
Not only does Fish grasp this nettle, he waves it about enthusiastically: 
And here we come to the heart of the matter, the justifi cation of liberal 
education. You know the questions: Will it benefi t the economy? Will it 
fashion an informed citizenry? Will it advance the cause of justice? Will it 
advance anything? Once again the answer is no, no, no, and no.110
If the point of liberal arts education is what I say it is—to lay out the history 
and structure of political and ethical dilemmas without saying yes or no to any 
108. Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom Against Itself: Boycotting Israeli Universities, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(Oct. 28, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/academic-
freedom-against-itself-boycotting-israeli-universities/. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 
109. 
109. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 153-54. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 127.
110. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 55.
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of the proposed courses of action—what is the yield that justifi es the enormous 
expenditure of funds and energies? Beats me!111
What can you say to the tax-payer who asks, “What good does a program in 
Byzantine art do me?” Nothing.112
Fish is aware that this nettle will probably appear pleasing to nobody but 
him. (In Versions of Academic Freedom he says of the “It’s just a job” school that it 
“may have only one member and you’re reading him now.”113) Surely, it will be 
objected, the humanities at least teach critical thinking and analytical skills 
that are useful in other contexts. Sure, replies Fish, but these things can be 
taught in many venues; the academy is not necessary for them to fl ourish.
So two cheers for critical thinking, but the fact that you can learn how to do it 
in any number of contexts means that it cannot be claimed for the humanities 
as a special benefi t only they can supply. Justifi cation requires more than 
evidence that a consumer can get a desirable commodity in your shop, too; it 
requires a demonstration that you have the exclusive franchise.114
Fish is not saying that the academic job cannot be given any justifi cation; 
he is saying that the justifi cation can refer only to the goals and values of the 
academic job itself, and the pleasures experienced by academics in advancing 
those goals and values.
Nguyen Chau Giao asks, “Dr. Fish, when was the last time you read a poem
. . . that so moved you to take certain actions to improve your lot or others?” 
To tell the truth, I can’t remember a single time. But I can remember countless 
times when I’ve read a poem (like Herbert’s “Matins”) and said “Wow!” or 
“Isn’t that just great?” That’s more than enough in my view to justify the 
enterprise of humanistic study, but I cannot believe, as much as I would like 
to, that the world can be persuaded to subsidize my moments of aesthetic 
wonderment.115
To put the position more generally, the justifi cation (and criticism) of any 
practice has to be internal. It has to use the modes of reasoning and the 
conceptions of evidence and the criteria of excellence that the practice already 
recognizes. Although I cannot expand upon it here, this is a refl ection of 
111. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.
112. Stanley Fish, The Crisis of the Humanities Offi  cially Arrives, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 11, 2010, 
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/the-crisis-of-the-humanities-
offi  cially-arrives/?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Crisis of Humanities].
113. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 9.
114. Stanley Fish, The Uses of the Humanities, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 13, 2008, 9:30 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/the-uses-of-the-humanities-part-
two/ [hereinafter Fish, Uses of Humanities Two].
115. Id.
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Fish’s commitment to the autonomy of practices, which in turn follows from 
his anti-foundationalism:116
Each practice is answerable to the norms implicit in its own history and 
conventions. . . . [J]ustifi cation can only proceed within that history and in 
relation to those conventions. . . . Justifi cation is always internal and can only 
get off  the ground if the value it seeks to uncover or defend is presupposed and 
is (surreptitiously) guiding the process at the end of which it is triumphantly 
revealed. Justifi cation never starts from scratch, and can only begin if 
everything it seeks to demonstrate is already taken for granted.117
Justifi cation (and criticism) of the academic job therefore cannot refer to 
the goals and values of other institutions or practices, such as democracy 
or religion or commerce. Fish is particularly dismissive of any attempt to 
understand academia by using the values and paradigms of commerce. 
“Higher education is just not in the same business as business,” he insists.118 
Students should not be analogized to “consumers” of what the university 
“produces,” because unlike the consumers of cars, “the recipients of higher 
education do not know in advance what they need. If they did, they wouldn’t 
need it, and what they often want, at least at the outset, is an education that 
will tax their energies as little as possible.”119 Academics therefore should not 
pay any attention to what students want when they design and teach a course. 
Nor should universities disestablish traditional academic departments, such 
as classics, on the grounds that they attract few students, as an automobile 
manufacturer might stop producing a model that does not sell well.120
[I]n the academy there is no product except knowledge, and that may take 
decades to develop, if it develops at all. The concept of market share is 
inapposite; effi  ciency is not a goal; and there is no inventory to put on the 
shelves. Instead the norms are endless deliberations, explorations that may 
go nowhere, problems that only fi ve people in the world even understand, 
lifetime employment that is not taken away even when nothing is achieved, 
expensively labor-intensive practices and no bottom line. What is an outsider 
to make of that? Not much, because he or she will lack the internalized 
understanding that renders the features of the enterprise intelligible, and in 
the absence of that understanding, the wanderer in a strange land will see only 
anomalies and mistakes that should be corrected.121
116. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 60-64.
117. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 112-13. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 22-25, 132; 
Fish, Scholarship and Politics, supra note 39; Fish, Crisis of Humanities, supra note 112.
118. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 108.
119. Id. at 159. 
120. Id. at 158, 164-65.
121. Stanley Fish, Wanted: Someone Who Knows Nothing About the Job, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(Feb. 24, 2008, 6:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/
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Fish does not see the fact that justifi cation always has to be internal as a 
limitation on our ability to defend the academic job. Rather, he understands 
the robust refusal to consider external values and goals to be the best and most 
principled way to defend the academic job.
To the question “of what use are the humanities?,” the only honest answer 
is none whatsoever. And it is an answer that brings honor to its subject. 
Justifi cation, after all, confers value on an activity from a perspective outside 
its performance. An activity that cannot be justifi ed is an activity that refuses 
to regard itself as instrumental to some larger good. The humanities are their 
own good.”122
Trying to justify academia (or any practice) by appealing to the values of an 
outside practice is self-defeating. Before you begin you have already conceded 
to your opponent that your practice has no inherent value and makes sense 
only when viewed through the lens of something else:
I believe that the demand for justifi cation should be resisted because it is 
always the demand that you account for what you do in someone else’s 
terms, be they the terms of the state, or of the economy, or of the project 
of democracy. “Tell me, why should I as a businessman or a governor or a 
preacher of the Word, value what you do?” There is no answer to this question 
that does not involve preferring the values of the person who asks it to yours. 
The moment you acquiesce to the demand for justifi cation, you have lost the 
game, because even if you succeed, what you will have done is acknowledge 
that your eff orts are instrumental to some external purpose; and if you fail, as 
is more likely, you leave yourself open to the conclusion that what you do is 
really not needed.123
But this severely minimalist position cannot stand unqualifi ed. There are 
two diff erent questions in play here, as Fish acknowledges: “The person who 
asks you to justify what you do is not saying, ‘tell me why you value the activity,’ 
but ‘convince me that I should.’”124 That is, “why do you do it?” is one question, 
and “why should I help you do it?” is another. Fish has argued that one can 
answer the fi rst question only by referring to values, goals, and pleasures 
entirely internal to academic practice. As for the second question, he says 
that it is better not to answer it at all. But while proudly declining to defend 
the academic enterprise to an outsider may be justifi ed and praiseworthy in 
some contexts (a dinner party, perhaps), it would be disastrous in others. In 
particular it would be disastrous to refuse to defend the academic project to 
122. Fish, Will Humanities Save Us?, supra note 23. But note the clarifi cation that comes in Stanley 
Fish, Uses of Humanities Two, supra note 114 (“Note that what we’re talking about here is the 
study, not the production, of humanistic texts. The question I posed in the column was 
not do works of literature, philosophy and history have instrumental value, but does the 
academic analysis of works of literature, philosophy and history have instrumental value.”).
123. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27. See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 56-57, 59, 104; FISH, 
VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 49.
124. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 154.
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those whose help the academy needs, or who have the power to harm the 
academic project. 
Fish, the former dean, knows this well. He knows that “no form of 
[academic] work—including even the work of, say, natural science—stands 
apart from the political, social and economic concerns that underlie the 
structures and practices of a society.”125 That is, the success of the academy 
depends upon favorable conditions existing outside the academy. Some 
non-academic institutions have to be prepared to fund the university, and to 
maintain strong inhibitions against interfering with the work of academics as 
they pursue their disciplinary truths. But there will always be competing views 
about where the government or a foundation should spend its money, and 
how closely it should concern itself with the activities of those who receive its 
money. “It is no doubt true that a web of politics surrounds and undergirds 
everything that goes on in higher education. Private and public sources fund 
colleges and universities, and they could have chosen—and some would say 
should have chosen—to fund something else.”126 So if external conditions 
favorable to the university are achieved, this will be a political (in the broad 
sense) success achieved against resistance from competing viewpoints. And, as 
we shall see, Fish thinks academics should engage in this contest by defending 
the university against external viewpoints that misunderstand or denigrate the 
academic job.
It might seem that Fish is falling into a contradiction here. How can he say 
to academics that they should defend the university against attacks, and also 
say that “any justifi cation of the academy is always a denigration of it”?127 He 
cleverly avoids any contradiction when he identifi es ways of defending the 
academic job to outsiders that do not have recourse to non-internal goals and 
values. One such method was described in Professional Correctness. An academic 
can try to get the outsider to experience fi rsthand the pleasures of doing the 
academic job. In that book Fish put on display the skills and pleasures of 
a literary scholar working on the fi rst three words of Milton’s Lycidas, “Yet 
once more,”128 and on a single line from Milton’s Paradise Lost, “And Devils 
to adore for Deities.”129 With enormous erudition he draws out the multiple 
meanings and histories that sit behind these few words, in the hope that by 
displaying the academic job in action those attending to him will gain a sense 
of its merits. But later, in Save the World on Your Own Time, he seems to have given 
up on this approach:
[I]t won’t work to explain the academic world to nonacademics while standing 
on one foot. That is, you can’t in a short time teach people to value activities 
125. Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11. 
126. Fish, Closing Argument, supra note 14.
127. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 154.
128. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 4-17.
129. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 108-14.
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they have never engaged in. . . . Remember, it takes four or more years to 
initiate students into the pleasures of the academic life, and in many cases the 
eff ort is not successful. Why should anyone think that the lessons could be 
taught and accepted in twenty minutes?130
Fish identifi es a second consistent method for defending the academic job 
in Save the World on Your Own Time by applying the maxim that the best defense 
is a good off ense. He urges academics to stop being so meek and mild in the 
face of attacks on the academic job. Instead of being passive victim types, 
academics should go on the front foot and club the challenger with the fact 
that he or she is not an insider, and therefore knows nothing at all about the 
matter under discussion. Challengers should be told to shut up and leave the 
academic professionals alone to get on with the job. Fish advocates
embracing the fact that few nonacademics understand what we do and why we 
do it, and turning it into a weapon. Instead of saying, “Let me tell you what 
we do so that you’ll love us,” or “Let me explain how your values are really our 
values too,” say, “We do what we do, we’ve been doing it for a long time, it has 
its own history, and until you learn it or join it, your opinions are not worth 
listening to.” Instead of defending classics or French literature or sociology, 
ask those who think they need defending what they know about them, and if 
the answer is “not much” . . . suggest, ever so politely, that they might want 
to go back to school. Instead of trying to justify your values (always a weak 
position), assume them and assume too your right to defi ne and protect them. 
And when you are invited to explain, defend, or justify, just say no.131
He off ers his own conduct as a model for what can be achieved in this 
manner. His side of the public debates he conducted with Dinesh D’Souza are 
recorded in chapters 3 to 7 of There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech . . . and It’s a Good 
Thing, Too. In those debates Fish robustly defended the university against the 
neoconservative attacks on it during the “culture wars.” He reports that when 
he was Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of 
Illinois at Chicago he refused to let a critique of the university by a parent or 
legislator or government offi  cial pass in silence.
I said many nasty things about members of Congress, Illinois state 
representatives and senators, the governor of Illinois, the governor’s budget 
director, and the governor-appointed Illinois Board of Higher Education. I 
called these people ignorant, misinformed, demagogic, and dishonest and 
repeatedly suggested that when it came to colleges and universities, either 
they didn’t know what they were talking about or (and this is worse) they did 
know and were deliberately setting out to destroy public higher education.132
He admits “[t]hat’s not the way senior academic administrators usually talk 
to their political masters, but try it; you might just like it. And it might even 
130. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 164.
131. Id. at 165-66.
132. Id. at 162. See generally 161-67; Fish, Crisis of Humanities, supra note 112.
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work. God knows that the defensive please-sir-could-we-have-more posture 
doesn’t.”133
Fish also briefl y mentions a third mode of defense that takes a diff erent 
course. Instead of refusing to justify the academy by using values and goals 
external to its defi ning job, he acknowledges that one could use such arguments 
as rhetorical tools without believing in them.
True, Finkin and Post . . . contend that the product of academic work is a 
higher social good that justifi es extending to professors degrees of latitude 
and freedom others do not enjoy. But I think of this argument as more 
strategic than substantive, as an attempt to add to the weapons the academy 
might have at its disposal when the inevitable attacks come. “For the common 
good” is a good talking point and I can think of occasions when I might use 
it myself, although I might have to bite my tongue.134
To the charge that this is a cynical and unprincipled way of proceeding, 
Fish would reply that it is completely acceptable to use in a political context 
arguments that you would judge to be defective in another context. If such an 
activity is engaged in to advance one of your deep commitments (such as the 
value of academic work), then it is principled and non-cynical.135
But there is a fourth way of defending the academic job that sits between 
Fish’s second and third methods, and thereby avoids having to use arguments 
that Fish would have to bite his tongue to employ. It is a method that is 
suggested by many of Fish’s remarks, but that he himself does not take up. 
As we have seen, Fish emphatically rejects the claim that the goal of academic 
work is to improve the character of students, or achieve social justice, or 
develop democratic skills, or increase the gross domestic product, or inculcate 
an appreciation of our own and other cultures, and so on. He acknowledges 
that sometimes examples of disciplinary work might achieve some of these 
goals, but such eff ects are always only contingent, accidental, and cannot be 
planned. For this reason he dismisses them.
I’m not saying that there is no connection at all between the successful practice 
of ethical, social, and political virtues and the courses of instruction listed in 
the college catalogue; it’s always possible that something you come across 
or something a teacher says might strike a chord that sets you on a life path 
you might not otherwise have chosen. But these are contingent eff ects, and as 
contingent eff ects they cannot be designed and shouldn’t be aimed at.136
133. Stanley Fish, The Crisis of the Humanities II, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:30 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/crisis-of-the-humanities-ii/ [hereinafter 
Fish, Crisis of Humanities Two].
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Fish is very strict about what can be used to justify the academic enterprise. 
For him it has to be “internal” in a very strong sense. It has to be a benefi t that 
the academic job aims to produce deliberately, and it has to be a distinctive 
benefi t that only the academy produces. (Remember his “two cheers for critical 
thinking” earlier.137)
However, I think that Fish’s powerful defl ationary thrust has caused him to 
dismiss too quickly possible defenses of academic work that refer to its wider 
benefi ts without making those wider benefi ts the goal of academic work. For 
example, Fish argued that “[h]igher education is not valuable because of the 
benefi ts some nonacademics might see in it; that’s like valuing the theater or 
art because they bring people into the inner city.”138 But surely it can sometimes 
be very useful to point out that theaters bring people into the inner city if one’s 
goal is to get non-theater people (such as a city council) to contribute money to 
establish a theater downtown. Similarly, just because any wider social benefi ts 
of academic work are collateral (and possibly random) eff ects of work done 
to achieve completely diff erent goals, that does not mean that these eff ects, if 
there are enough of them, cannot be used to justify the academic enterprise 
to outsiders for whom such eff ects are signifi cant. This is a position that Larry 
Alexander has advanced:
Fish is correct that academic work need not be intended to produce goods 
extrinsic to disciplinary knowledge. . . . Nonetheless, good academic work, 
even if not guided by extrinsic goals, does produce things of immense benefi t 
to the world beyond the academy. . . . Indeed, if the academy did not serve 
these external goals, even if indirectly as byproducts of academic work, there 
would be no reason for the rest of society to support the academic enterprise. 
. . . [O]ne can serve a goal without being guided by it; and in the case of 
academic disciplines, one can best produce these extrinsic goods if one 
is not guided by the aim of producing them. The argument is an indirect 
consequentialist one, but it is nevertheless consequentialist. And Fish should 
embrace it. In the end, his salary depends on others’ belief in it.”139
This line of defense is not based on grandiloquent claims about the benefi ts 
of academic work of the kind that Fish wants to defl ate. It is not claimed 
that academic work aims to produce anything besides the achievement of 
disciplinary truths. The defense is based only on empirical evidence of some 
unintended, non-academic benefi ts that can be causally connected to academic 
work. The fact that these collateral benefi ts can sometimes be produced by 
non-academic institutions as well does not undermine their usefulness in 
defending the university, I would argue, contrary to Fish’s more restrictive 
of how academic work enhances or even produces that pleasure. It may or may not, but if it 
does, that’s an accidental benefi t.”).
137. Fish, Uses of Humanities Two, supra note 114.
138. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 130.
139. Lawrence Alexander, Fish on Academic Freedom: A Merited Assault on Nonsense, but Perhaps a Bridge Too 
Far, 9 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013).
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view. Nor need it be the case that all types of academic work will produce 
such collateral benefi ts, or that such benefi ts will be produced regularly. But 
if empirical investigation can identify enough such benefi ts, and they are 
suffi  ciently widely spread among a variety of disciplines, they will be valuable 
ammunition to use against those who seek to dismiss and undermine the work 
of universities. However, if it were then argued that random, contingent social 
benefi ts from academic work were not good enough, and that academics 
should be aiming to produce such benefi ts regularly and in volume, the correct 
response would be “No. Not only is that not our job, it is fundamentally 
antithetical to our job.”
Would it not be a defl ection from the academic focus of scholars to 
constantly be looking outside their disciplines for any benefi cial unintended 
consequences of their work? Quite possibly. Gathering such evidence is 
a diff erent job from the academic job, and therefore it should be done by a 
diff erent kind of professional. In Professional Correctness Fish makes the valuable 
suggestion that universities hire aggressive public relations people to do work 
like this.
I don’t mean the damage-control types found in most university public-
relations offi  ces, who are even more timid than their bosses and spend much of 
their time keeping things out of the news. . . . No, I mean publicity-seeking types 
who are always thinking of ways to grab huge hunks of newspaper space or air 
time and fi ll it with celebrations of the university. . . . The public justifi cation 
of academic practices is too important a task to be left to academics; for after 
all—and this has been my message from the beginning—when there’s a job to 
be done, and you want it done correctly, call in a professional.140
If this suggestion were followed, then the next time you were asked to justify 
or defend academia, you could say “No thanks. That’s someone else’s job.”
How Does Fish’s Analysis Apply to Legal Education?
We have seen Fish insist that the academic job is seeking truth and 
advancing knowledge, but law schools are pragmatically concerned with 
teaching practical skills and equipping students for employment outside 
the academic environment. So are law schools too vocational to belong in 
a university, according to Fish’s argument? Are they just off ering fancier 
and more expensive versions of courses like “Transportation and Materials 
Moving”? Fish recommended that purely vocational courses like this should 
not be taught at a university, and he acknowledged that this exclusion could 
apply to some professional schools too:
If this is, in fact, what transpires in a particular professional school—if students 
are taught methods and techniques in the absence of any inquiry into their 
sources, validity, and philosophical underpinnings—that professional school 
140. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 126.
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is not the location of any intellectual activity and is ‘academic’ only in the 
sense that it is physically housed in a university.141
However, Fish believes that law can very easily be “academicized” in the 
fashion required to be a legitimate university discipline:
One can, however, make the case that the practice of law is more than a 
technical/strategic exercise in which doctrines, precedents, rules and tests are 
marshaled in the service of a client’s cause. The marshaling takes place within 
an enterprise that is purposive. That is, law is more than an aggregation of 
discrete tactics and procedures; it is an enterprise informed by a vision of how 
the state can and cannot employ the legalized violence of which it is the sole 
proprietor. That vision will come into view in the wake of a set of inquiries. 
What obligations do citizens owe one another? How far can the state go in 
enforcing those obligations? What restrictions on what the state can do to 
(and for) its citizens should be in place? How do legal cultures diff er with 
respect to these issues?142
In other words, it is possible both to teach law as a practice and also to 
subject law to academic analysis.
Not only does Fish argue that law can be academicized, he also believes that 
it should be academicized. The evidence for this is that he has devoted a lot of 
time and energy to doing just that, both in his writing and in his teaching at law 
schools such as Duke and Cardozo. He is particularly interested in subjecting 
to academic analysis freedom of speech,143 freedom of religion,144 and contract 
law.145 He thus joins in the eff orts of other legal academics who write books and 
articles in which they seek not simply to describe the current state of a part of 
the law, but also to explain how this current state developed out of past states; 
how political and social and economic forces impacted on the development of 
the law; how the law intersects with debates in philosophy and hermeneutics 
and political theory; how the current state of the law is likely to change in the 
future, and so on. As well as focusing on particular substantive areas of law, 
legal academics sometimes engage in more general attempts to explain law 
as a whole; to describe what sets it apart from other social institutions and 
to make clear what its unique job is. H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and 
Richard Posner are prominent jurisprudence scholars who have taken up this 
more abstract academic exercise, and Fish has joined them too.146 He entered 
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142. Stanley Fish, Teaching Law, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Dec. 12, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://
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into a decade-long debate with Dworkin147 and has also written in response 
to Hart148 and Posner.149 He has developed his own distinctive jurisprudential 
position which I have described elsewhere.150
But what about the views of a law student who is paying a lot of money 
to acquire a professional qualifi cation, and who might consider the academic 
inquiries that Fish values to be unnecessary and expensive luxuries? Recall 
Fish’s earlier point that students should not be analogized to consumers, 
because unlike the consumers of cars “the recipients of higher education do 
not know in advance what they need. If they did, they wouldn’t need it, and 
what they often want, at least at the outset, is an education that will tax their 
energies as little as possible.”151 Therefore Fish would not give much weight to 
what he would consider to be the uninformed views of law students as to what 
legal education requires. He would also point out that if law students want to 
obtain their law qualifi cation from a university, as opposed to a polytechnic or 
an apprenticeship, then engaging with the academic study of law is part of the 
process they must go through to obtain it.
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